The Pentagon's (CIA) Man in Iraq
David Corn *
Toward the
start of the second Persian Gulf War, I found myself in a room with R. James Woolsey,
CIA chief during the first two years of the Clinton administration. A
television was turned on, and we both watched a news report on the latest
development in the North Korea nuclear drama. How much longer, I asked him,
could this administration wait before dealing with North Korea and its efforts
to develop nuclear-weapons material? A little while, but not too long, he said.
Until after the Iraq war? Yes, Woolsey said, we can take care of things then.
(That was when the prevailing assumption was the war in Iraq would take about
as long as a Donald Rumsfeld press conference.) And, I wondered, is this a
challenge that can be taken care of with, say, a well-planned and contained
bombing raid, one that strikes the nuclear facilities in question? “Oh, no, “
he said. “This is going to be war.” War, full-out war, with a nation that might
already have a few nuclear weapons and that does have 600,000 North Korean
soldiers stationed 25 miles from Seoul, with 37,000 US troops in between? “Yes,
war.” He didn't flinch, didn't bat an eye.
Woolsey is
something of a prophet of war. And the Pentagon wants him to be part of its
team running postwar Iraq.
On April 2,
Woolsey made headlines by telling students at UCLA that the Iraq war was part
of “World War IV.” Speaking at a teach-in sponsored by campus Republicans and
Americans for Victory Over Terrorism, a pro-war-in-Iraq group founded by
William Bennett, Woolsey remarked, “This fourth world war, I think, will last
considerably longer than either World Wars I or II did for us. Hopefully not
the full four-plus decades of the Cold War.” He cited three enemies: the
religious leaders of Iran, the “fascists” of Syria and Iraq, and Islamic
extremists like Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. He called for the United States
to back democratic movements throughout the Middle East, which “will make a lot
of people very nervous,” particularly Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the
Saudi Arabia oligarchs. “We want you nervous,” he said. “We want you to realize
now, for the fourth time in a hundred years, this country and its allies are on
the march and that we are on the side of those whom you--the Mubaraks, the
Saudi Royal family--most fear: We're on the side of your own people.” In other
words: crusade, anyone?
Woolsey's
comments won him several minutes on the cable news networks. But a quick check
of clips showed that he has been saying the same for months, using the exact
same words. For instance, last November, during a speech before an audience
assembled by conservative provocateur David Horowitz, Woolsey told the crowd
“that we are in World War IV” and “I don't believe this terror war is every
really going to go away until we change the face of the Middle East.” Given his
much-promoted diagnosis and prescription--correct or not--the other Woolsey
news-of-the-week seemed even more bizarre than it had originally appeared.
A few days
before CNN blared, “Ex-CIA director: US faces 'World War IV,” The Washington
Post reported that the Pentagon, in concocting its postwar plans, had proposed
installing Woolsey as head of Iraq's information ministry. The State Department
had derived its own list of former ambassadors and experts to oversee Iraqi
governmental agencies once the war ends (presumably with a US victory). The
Pentagon didn't fancy State's list--too many midlevel types and bureaucrats. It
wanted more prominent Americans in charge and its own guys. The Pentagon
nominated Woolsey for the information slot. The White House sensibly said, no
way.
Woolsey's bring-it-on
desire to confront much of the Arab world aside, whoever in the Pentagon
suggested tapping any former CIA head to run any part of a post-Hussein
government should be shit-canned. How might this look to Iraqis and the Arab
public? Were the Pentagon schemers unaware of the reputation the CIA has in the
Arab world and throughout most of the globe? The folks next door in Iran
probably still remember well how the CIA supported the brutal secret police of
the Shah they booted. And how many Iraqis (and other Arabs) would not believe
that Woolsey's appointment was not part of some conspiracy? Moreover, how much
credibility would a CIA vet--who headed an agency that occasionally produces
covert propaganda--bring to this sensitive position that demands the trust of
the public? Answer: none. And placing Americans at the helm of individual
ministries might in and of itself stir objections within Iraq and among allies.
As Adnan Pachachi, who was foreign minister in the government deposed by Saddam
Hussein, told the Financial Times, “It makes no sense for the US to involve
itself in the details,” “It's not what the Iraqis want and what the
international community wants. It's not even what the US's allies want.”
That Pentagon
officials would even consider placing a CIA man in charge of the Ministry of
Truth is evidence their judgment is severely impaired. This was not merely a
wacky idea that got floated by some outsider; this was a serious Pentagon
proposal that required White House intervention to kill it. A safe bet would be
that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
vetted the list that included Woolsey. According to the New York Times,
Wolfowitz is controlling the selection process, handpicking his proteges and
former officials for the various ministries and earning the sobriquet
“Wolfowitz of Arabia.” ( The New York Times also noted that “Wolfie's people”
are “thought to be particularly fervent about trying to remake Iraq as a beacon
of democracy and a country with a tilt toward Israel.” The latter mission is a
surefire way to win over the Iraqi public and convince Arabs that the United
States is in Iraq only to “liberate” its people, not to advance its own
strategic interests.) Retired General Jay Garner, the Pentagon-named civilian
viceroy who will oversee the de facto cabinet ministries while reporting to
General Tommy Franks, must have glanced at the list as well.
What were they
thinking? Can these guys be trusted to run postwar Iraq? The problems with
Woolsey include not just his CIA past and his present-day advocacy of an
all-out showdown in the Middle East. He is also a well-known champion of the
Iraqi National Congress, an exile group run by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi
businessman who has been out of the country since 1956 and who was convicted in
1992 of defrauding his own Jordanian bank. (Chalabi claims he was set up.) And
Woolsey's law firm, Shea & Gardner, is a registered agent for the INC,
though Woolsey says he does not participate in his firm's work on behalf of the
group. The INC, a Pentagon favorite, has not been a model of democracy and
transparency, angering other exiles in the past for not revealing what it did
with the financial assistance it received from the US government. And the State
Department and the CIA have not been fans of the INC and Chalabi. Whatever
Chalabi's and the INC's flaws, it was misguided (read: dumb) for the Pentagon
to ask an American firmly identified with what will be just one faction vying
for power in postwar Iraq to run, in essence, the Iraqi media.
Still, Woolsey
may end up with a role in the occupation government. The White House vetoed
embedding him at the top of the information ministry, but news reports say the
Pentagon might assign him another senior position. And what's next? Ken Lay to
head up the new Iraqi energy ministry? Trent Lott, the cultural ministry?
Richard Perle, the new Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations?
A postwar job
for Woolsey the Would-be Conqueror would be unnecessarily provocative. During
the occupation, the United States should conduct itself with humility and
sensitivity (especially since it seems, once again, to be shoving the United
Nations aside). These are not qualities for which the Pentagon is renowned. To
many within Iraq and elsewhere, the message conveyed by any Woolsey appointment
will be, Washington has sent the CIA to take over Iraq. So why do it? Does
Woolsey alone possess the needed skill set? (Which American will be in charge
of the new Iraqi intelligence agency?) But credit the Pentagon with loyalty,
for it appears to be sticking with one of the most prominent cheerleaders for
war in Iraq (and perhaps beyond) and standing by a grand tradition of war. To
the victor go the spoils. In this case, no matter how ridiculous or
counterproductive that may be.
* The Nation,
April 04, 2003
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