Military
Globalism
William Greider *
One of the first casualties of war may be those
happy-talk forecasts of a robust recovery once the bombing starts in Iraq, but a
far more momentous economic question accompanies Bush's invasion plans: Can
free-market globalization survive in a world governed by one nation's
overwhelming military power? The global economy has largely disappeared from
political discussions in recent months as national leaders preoccupied
themselves with warmaking. But the boosters of corporate-led globalization
should understand that their vision of a New World Order is fundamentally
imcompatible with George W. Bush's.
Who is to rule the world's future--global markets or
national governments? The regime of globalization promotes an unfettered
marketplace as the dynamic instrument organizing international relations. The
other regime relies on the old-fashioned military power of the
nation-state--the United States alone in this case--to impose its will on
others in the name of global order. One system promises the free flow of
capital, goods and technologies across national boundaries, largely exempted
from control by sovereign nations. The other system sets out to intervene in
the private marketplace--by force of arms if it chooses--to countermand any
market transactions it regards as threatening. In history, of course,
capitalism has often advanced arm-in-arm with military interventions. But that
system was known as colonialism--the fusion of commercial ambitions and
military conquest. It contradicts the principles claimed for free-running
globalization, or at least unmasks its high-minded pretensions.
The outlines of this profound collision of purposes
are now visible though not yet widely recognized, especially in Washington. Paul
McCulley, a managing director of PIMCO, the world's largest bond investment
fund, based in Newport Beach, California, observes the structural shift already
under way in global governance, driven by the weakened condition of the global
economy but also by the imperial ambitions of Washington. "American
imperialism is, by definition, a retreat away from global capitalism, a retreat
from the invisible hand of markets in favor of a more dominant role for the
visible fist of governments," McCulley wrote.
This is a "regime change" the warrior crowd
may not have anticipated, but the consequences are implicit in their insistence
that the United States will capture and take control of Iraq's oil, the
second-largest petroleum reserves in the world. American statesmen grumble
about the mercenary interests of the French, Russians and Chinese, whose
companies currently have contracts for Iraqi oil production, but what of
America's mercenary interests? The Wall Street Journal reports that the
Pentagon has already tapped Halliburton (the Vice President's old company) to
manage after-action cleanup of the Iraqi oilfields. Industry analysts figure
Halliburton and other US firms could share $1.5 billion in contracts. Meanwhile,
the US Agency for International Development is seeking ambitious proposals from
America's five largest construction companies (including Halliburton) to
rebuild Iraq's roads and bridges, the electrical grid, housing, schools and
hospitals after America's smart bombs finish their work (no foreigners need
apply for the contract). American taxpayers will presumably pick up the tab,
unless Washington instructs the US colonial general to seize Iraq's oil income
as our own.
The threat to globalization is not the wasted American
dollars but Washington's readiness to mix US commercial interests with its
self-appointed role as global protector. At a time when the US economy must
borrow from abroad to sustain its own domestic consumption, this move is sure
to deepen distrust among trading partners and foreign creditors--suspicions
that will permeate every forum of the trading system. Americans who imagine
that their government will manage Iraqi oil to insure cheap gasoline may be
disillusioned too. As overseer of Iraq, the United States would doubtless act
like other OPEC members, managing production to insure stable oil prices at
around $26 a barrel. Anything less threatens oil-producing countries--and oil
companies. The Bush White House, if it has any sense, will quickly pass off
this role to some sort of international agency. Otherwise, it is going to be
caught between the interests of US consumers and its buddies in the oil
industry.
The far more substantial conflict with globalization
involves nuclear proliferation and Bush's commitment to fight the spread of
so-called weapons of mass destruction on any front, with armed force if
countries don't cooperate. It is good to see conservatives finally embrace the
cause of nonproliferation, but they are about a generation late and used to be
on the other side--defending multinational corporations against laws
prohibiting export of defense-sensitive materials and machinery. Where did
Saddam Hussein acquire his dangerous toxins? He bought them from European and
American companies. Where did India and Pakistan get starter kits to develop
nuclear weapons? Same place. For that matter, how did Israel get its nukes? In
other words, to truly halt the spread of dangerous technologies, Washington will
need much more than conquering armies. It will have to create an effective and
intrusive set of export controls--worldwide--that can monitor a vast range of
industrial goods and prohibit many items from entering into the "free
trade" system.
A central quality of the globalizing economy is how
fluidly it disperses advanced technologies from rich countries to poor
countries--literally sharing the industrial tools of the wealthiest economies
with many underdeveloped societies. In the broad sweep of human development,
that aspect of globalization is virtuous (though it does dilute the advantages
of the leading economies). Yet technology transfer cannot easily proceed if
subjected to stringent regulatory controls by governments searching for
forbidden weapons components. The controversies over Iraqi weapons illustrate
why such rules are fiendishly difficult to devise and enforce. Was Saddam
buying aluminum tubes and industrial magnets for a nuclear-bomb project or for
standard uses in domestic centrifuges? The United States charged bomb-making
motives; the UN inspectors endorsed Saddam's claim of innocence. Multiply these
ambiguities and conflicting interpretations across thousands of industrial
chemicals, hardware or software. Bush's desire to control the terms of
trade--only nice countries can buy the dangerous stuff--sounds like Sisyphus on
the Potomac.
While Washington focused obsessively on war with Iraq,
it seemed to forget for the moment that the global economy remains wounded and
groaning. When the war is over, these troubling facts will return with brutal
clarity. The worry is not only the weakened US economy, which props up global
trade by playing the supportive role as "buyer of last resort" for
other nations' exports. The global system itself has still not recovered from
the great financial crisis of 1997-98; bank lending to emerging economies
remains $177 billion below five years ago. Nor has the United States shaken off
the deep wounds from its own bursting stock-market bubble. The economic arrows
are pointing down again at present--even as the United States absorbs record
trade deficits. If this White House understood what is at stake, Bush would be
launching major public-works spending here in the homeland instead of bombing,
then rebuilding, Iraq. If globalization's ardent advocates grasped the deeper
economic implications of Bush's war, they too would be demanding to bring the
troops home.
* The Nation, March 13, 2003.
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