A Lesson in
Diplomacy
Juliet Johnson *
Back in the late 1980s, Condoleezza Rice--then
just a lowly associate professor--taught one of the best courses I took as a
Stanford undergraduate. Although she called it “The Role of the Military in
Politics,” the most memorable class sessions involved a lengthy crisis
simulation exercise designed to teach the fine art of avoiding war. She split
the large class into several independent groups, with each group subdivided
into key Washington foreign policy roles. My group had a President, a Vice
President, a National Security Adviser, a Defense Secretary, a CIA Director,
Joint Chiefs and several members of Congress. I was the Secretary of State. Our
mission: to resolve an emerging international crisis peacefully if possible, by
force if necessary. Sound familiar?
Professor Rice's simulation presciently
challenged us to contain an impending civil war in Yugoslavia that, if
inflamed, threatened to spill over into neighboring countries. All of the
groups tried to achieve the same outcome--a peaceful resolution of the
conflict--but few succeeded. Rather, a group's result depended on the
strategies it used to pursue the goal. As we navigated the treacherous waters
of (simulated) international diplomacy, our group learned three valuable
lessons that Professor Rice's current colleagues in the Bush Administration
seem to be neglecting.
Rhetoric matters: During the simulation, I sent
an unintentionally condescending message to the Greek government. Only by
apologizing immediately and profusely did I manage to salvage our diplomatic
mission. If even accidental slights have unfortunate consequences, how much
harm can come from intentionally inflammatory rhetoric? When George W. Bush
used the word “crusade” to describe US antiterrorism efforts, it unwittingly
evoked images of Christian warriors marching to rescue the Holy Land from
Islamic infidels. Yet rather than retreating from this rhetorical stance, Bush
has fanned the flames by describing the current conflict with Iraq in biblical
terms, repeatedly invoking the Christian God and calling Iraq an agent of evil.
If Bush actually wants to fuel a “clash of civilizations,” this is a good way
to start. As then-candidate Bush himself said in the second presidential
debate, “if we're an arrogant nation, [other countries] will view us that way,
but if we're a humble nation, they'll respect us.” Which brings us to lesson
number two...
Seek international support: In our simulation,
the most successful groups immediately reached out to allies and to
international organizations in order to build a consensus on how to resolve the
crisis. Similarly, candidate Bush acknowledged the need for multilateral
cooperation on Iraq during that same second presidential debate, stating that
“[Saddam Hussein] is a danger, and...it's going to be important to rebuild that
coalition to keep the pressure on him.” Yet as President, Bush has taken an
“it's my way or the highway” approach. The Administration made it clear from
the beginning that US policy on Iraq would not be influenced by its European
allies or the United Nations, and has accused doubting foreign leaders of
cowardice. Bush's March 17 ultimatum conclusively signaled the failure of
diplomacy. This is coercion, not consultation. But perhaps even more important
in coalition-building is lesson number three...
Maintain credibility: Not surprisingly, the
groups in our class simulation that made the clearest and most credible
arguments in defense of their policies typically gained the most support for
them. As Bush noted in, yes, that second presidential debate, “I think
credibility is going to be very important in the future in the Middle East.” Yet
the Administration has not convincingly explained to the international community
why it thinks Saddam Hussein represents a uniquely immediate threat.
In particular, two avowed US motives for
insisting upon regime change undermine the Administration's credibility: Iraq's
alleged Al Qaeda connection and its human rights violations. The evidence tying
Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda is embarrassingly flimsy. Osama bin Laden has
publicly expressed contempt for the secular Hussein, and several other
countries--most notably Saudi Arabia, a close US ally--have much tighter Al
Qaeda connections. As a result, many suspect that Bush is merely using the
September 11 tragedy to justify his long-held desire to oust Hussein.
The Bush Administration's alleged concern for
human rights violations in Iraq is equally unconvincing. The Taliban in
Afghanistan had a reprehensible human rights record for years, but this did not
become an important issue for the Administration until after September 11. Liberia,
Burma, Turkmenistan and many other authoritarian states repress their people in
appalling ways, but US troops are not massed at their borders. Such weak
arguments for singling out Iraq breed cynicism and confusion in the
international community and encourage speculation that less honorable motives
are driving US foreign policy. The Administration is on the brink of war
without having made a good case for removing Saddam Hussein from power.
(Our group also learned a fourth
lesson--Congress can be safely ignored. The students playing members of
Congress in the simulation had a frustrating week, as the rest of us made all
of the important decisions. However, the Bush Administration understands this
lesson.)
In short, Rice's class taught us that C students
rush to war, while A students work diligently and patiently toward peaceful
solutions to international problems. When the Iraqi crisis has ended, what
grade will the current Administration have earned?
*
The Nation, March 18, 2003.
Regresar a la Página
Vigente de América Semanal...